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A CRITIQUE OF 
BERNARD HARING'S APPLICATION 
OF THE DOUBLE EFFECT 
PRINCIPLE 
Paul J. MlCALLEF 
THE PRINCIPLE of the double effect received its c1assical formulation in the 
writings of Thomas Aquinas who discussed it in relation to self-defence. 1 It may 
be stated as follows: 
1. Where an action, lawful in itse1f, 
2. produces two (or more) effects, one of which is good and the other (or others) 
evil, 
3. the evil effect may be permitted but not intended, 
4. provided that : 
a) the good effect is not achieved by means of the evil effect; 
b) there is a proportionately serious reason for permitting the unintended 
evil effect: and. 
c) other morally un question able means are ordinarily unavailable. 2 
In this essay, 1 am concerned not so much with the principle itself or with any 
detailed analysis of it as with a particular application of the principle proposed by 
Bernard Haring. 
Haring uses the following case, typical of the kind of dilemmas that arise in 
medical ethics, to illustrate how rigidity in applying the principle of the double effect 
renders the principle meaningless. However, the contrary position, his own, illustrates 
how f1cxibility in applying the principle shows up the non-applicability of the 
principlc itself. 
The case is totd by a gynecologist and reads as follows: 
1 was once called upon to perform an operation on a woman in the fourth month 
of pregnancy, to remove a malign uterine tumor. On the womb there were 
1. II-Il. q. 64. a.7. See also Joseph T. MANCiAN, "An Historical Analysis of the Principle of the Double 
Effeet". Theological Sludies. 10 (1949) 41-61; c.J. VAN DER POEL, "The Principle of the Double 
Erfeet". in Charles E. Curran (Ed). Absolules in Moral Theology, (Washington. D.C.: Corpus Books. 
19(8). 
2. For variolls formulatIOns and interpretations of the principle. see P. KNAUFR. "La détermination du 
bien et du mal moral par le principe du double effet". Nouvelle Revue Théologique, 87 (1965) 356-376: 
"The Hermeneutie Function of the Principle of Double Erfeet". Nall/ral LaI\" Forum. 12 (1967) 
132-167; Richard MCCORMICK, "Le principe du double effet", Concilium, 120 (1976) 105-120. 
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numerous very thin and fragile varicose veins which bled profusely, and 
attempts to suture them only aggravated the bleeding. Therefore, in order to 
save the woman from bleeding to death, 1 opened the womb and removed the 
fetus. Thereupon the uterus contracted, the bleeding ceased and the woman's life 
was saved. 1 was proud of what 1 had achieved, since the uterus of this woman, 
who was still childless, was undamaged and she could bear other children. But 1 
had to find out later from a noted moralist that although 1 had indeed acted in 
good faith, what 1 had done was, in his eyes, objective/y wrong. 1 would have 
been allowed to remove the bleeding uterus with the fetus itself, he said, but was 
not permitted to interrupt the pregnancy while leaving the womb intact. This 
latter, he said, constituted an immoral termination of pregnancy, though done 
for the purposes of saving the mother, while the other way would have been a 
lawful direct intention and action to save life. For him preservation of the 
woman's fertility and thereby, under sorne circumstances, preservation of the 
marriage itself, played no decisive role. 3 
Haring daims that the solution proposed by the noted moralist is int1exibly 
based on the distinction between direct and indirect abortion and results "in too 
literaI or mechanical applications". So he goes on to propose a solution of his own 
which, he says, follows a less artificialline of reasoning. 
On the great moral certainty, he says, that without direct intervention there is no 
chance of survival for both the mother and the child, the doctor "accepts the only 
chance to protect and serve life which Divine Providence has left to him. He saves the 
life of the mother while he does not truly deprive the fetus of its right to live, since it 
would not survive in any event if he failed to save the mother's Iife. Moreover, the 
preservation of the mother's fertility is an additional service to life". 4 
Haring's solution of the particular case he brings up disregarcls the requirements 
of the double effect principle. On the contrary, his solution falls outside the 
framework of the princip le and he assumes that he applies the principle less 
artificially simply by providing a distinction between malicious and non-malicious 
abortion. In this regard, while he condemns the former he appears to justify the latter 
mainly on the grounds that there is a proportionately serious reason for permitting 
the destruction of the fetus and "on the great moral certainty" that the fetus had no 
chance of survival. 
Beyond what Haring calls the too literaI or mechanical applications of the 
principle and what in fact any explanation of the principle gives the impression of 
being (in the context, "dissection of the principle" would be a better way of putting 
it), therc is a very important aspect which Haring overlooks. The distinctions and the 
3. Bernard HARING, "A Theological Evaluation", in John T. Noonan, Jr., The Moralirv of Aborrion 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 136-137: also in The Law of Christ 
(Westminster, Md: Newman Press, 1966). p. 212. Emphasis is author's. 
The English edition of this case speaks of "a mallgn tumor": the French edition, Perspc('lIl'C 
clmhienne pour une médecine humaine (Paris: Fayard, 1975), p. 109, speaks of "une tumeur bénigne". 
Accurding tu Dr. Jacques E. Rioux, Directeur, Clinique de planification des naissances, Ccntre 
Hospitalier de l'Université Laval, Quebec, there is no doubt that we are lIere dealing with a benign 
tumor which in turn rais es the question whether removal of the tumor was necessary in the first place. 
4. Ibid., p. 137. 
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principle that arises from them are commonly thought to provide the basis for an 
exception to the absolu te or near-absolute moral condemnation of abortion. In this 
context. abortion is thought to be permissible provided it comes within the terms and 
conditions of the double effect principle. In other words, il may appear that there is 
an area of therapeutic abortion which is morally admissible (i.e., when the directl)' 
intended action is a morally licit medical intervention), and another area which is not 
(i.e., when fetallife is direetly involved as an end in itself or as a means to an end). 
There is, in fact, more to the principle than appearing to justify particular cases 
of therapeutic abortion. The full import of the principle is not that it points up an 
exception nor that it lays down conditions as to when abortion is right and when it is 
wrong, nor that it is an attempt to achieve a moral balance betwecn maternaI and 
fetal rights. The thrust of the principle lies precisely in its attempt to establish the faet 
that there are actions which, conducive to the destruction of fetallife though they be, 
are no! in fact abortion in the moral sense. Most gynecologists would even say that 
they are not abortion in the medical sense either. In fact, bath spontaneous abortion 
and indirect abortion are instances or illustrations of what abortion is not. even 
though for practical purposes retention of the terminology concerning direct and 
indirect actions is unavoidable. 
Much of the controversy (and misunderstanding) surrounding the principle and 
its applications is largely due ta the kind of language used to describe the resulting 
evil effect. 
The evil effect is invariably described as a foreseen but unintended by-product of 
a directly-willed action. It is then argued that as long as the evil effeet is in some way 
"voluntary" or somehow eomes within the intentional order, it makes no difference 
whether it is willed in the moral sense or foreseen in the practical sense - which is 
basically why this dichotomy is ail too often considered to be a distinction without a 
difference or one that implies a choiee between two evils and of justifying an 
otherwise immoral action conveniently labelled as a foreseen but unintended and 
unavoidable evil consequence, simply by providing what may weil appear to be a 
mere "verbal escape mechanism".' 
It must be admitted that within this context, the term "voluntary" and its 
derivatives or its variations and, in general, the terminology used misleading. What is 
willed is the direct act and whatever effect is directly intended and sought. The evil 
efTect is neither intendecl nor willecl in any way. Grantecl that it is foreseen ancl 
foreseen to be unavoidable, it is not in any way voluntary. For this reason 
"voluntary" shoulcl not, in my opinion, be part of the definition of the foreseen cvil 
effect. In other words, the principle is an attempt to offer guidelines to distinguish as 
well as it possibly can between what is sought as an end in itself and what is permitted 
or tolerated as an unavoidable result of an otherwise morally acceptable action. 
To this effect, Dr. Mary S. Calderone tells of a group of eminent doctors who 
implicitly affirmed the validity of this aspect of the principle when they refusecl to 
5. Glanville WlILLU1S, The Saneri!.\" ot Lite and The Criminal LaH (London: Fabcr & Faber. 1 Y5~), 
p. 178. 
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dassify hysterectomy for uterine fibroids as a therapeutic abortion, even though 
therapy had lead to the destruction of the fetus. h 
At the Symposium on Aspects of Female Sexuality, he Id in New York in 1958, 
Dr. S,A, Cosgrove made a similar though somewhat marginal statement. He stated in 
this respect that he would not perform a therapeutic abortion since he did not 
consider it "good medicine", but that he would treat a definite life-threatening 
disease even if fetal death might result from the [reatment.' 
In Haring's application, the mother would have been saved by the direct 
termination of the pregnancy and in the circumstances whîch he describes his 
solution falls outside the framework of the double effect principle, His solution may 
indeed be, as he daims, "simple and more convincing" but his use of words like "less 
literai", "less mechanical" does not make it any more acceptable within the double 
effect principle, 1 hasten to add, however, that it may be acceptable on other grounds, 
At this point, it wou Id be worth reviewing briefly the position taken by the noted 
moralist cited by the gynecologist. The moralist daims that the moral course to 
folJow would have been "to remove the bleeding uterus with the fetus itself', Su ch an 
action, in the moralist's opinion, would have come under the double effect principle, 
l am not 50 sure that he is right either. 
The moralist daims that the doctor "was not permitted to interrupt the 
pregnancy while leaving the womb intact", Interrupting the pregnancy and removing 
the uterus would have been, in his opinion, "a lawful direct intention and action to 
save life", 
The moralist's position leaves no doubt as to the manner in which the mother 
should have been saved: the mother should have been saved by dircctly removing a 
vital organ - and with it the child - thereby rendering the mother incapable of 
bearing other children. 
The double effect principle's general terms of reference ensure that its appli-
cations will not be measured by the foot rule nor ca1culated with the assistance of 
tables, If one must therefore allow it to serve us father than to strangle us, the 
princip le does not appear to stipulate the conditions laid down by the moralist. In the 
circumstances, a less drastic course of action, as one might have to put it, would have 
been sufficient. In this particular case, the less drastic course of action would have 
been to remove the child because as Haring rightly points out, in agreement with the 
gynecologist, the child wou Id have died in any event as would the mother. 
The uterus contracted by the removal of the child, It would also have contracted 
by the removal of the uterus Ïtself. But removal of the uterus would not have been in 
the best interests of the mother and 1 would say of life itself. 
6. Cited in Richard A. MCCORMICK, "Abortion", America. 113 (1965) H77-8Hl: see also R.J. BURu.sur-; 
and l.C. BRAGG, "Full Term Abdominal Pregnancy", Journal al/he Amencan Medical Associa/ion, 
143 (19511 1349-1350, 
7. Ruth R. DOORBAR and Esther U. COKE, "Summary of Sorne Issues Raised during the Discussion 
Period", Quar/er/y Revie\1 of Sur!(ery, Ohs/('/rics and Gynecology. 16 (195'1) 240. 
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It would seem then that both Haring and the moralist are at fault : Haring in that 
he discusses the case outside the framework of the princip le and assumes that his 
solution falls within it; the moralist in that he attempts to make the principle 
applicable to a case where it is not. 
The case proposed puts forward two very simple courses of action: on the one 
hand, preservation of the mother's life and the various consequences accompanying 
this action; on the other, removal of the uterus and the death of the child. In ethical 
terms, whether the preservation of the mother's life and fertility is less commendable 
than the removal of a pregnant uterus. It is not a question of a choice between two 
evils; if anything, it is rather a question of two values though the value that would 
have been safeguarded by the removal of both uterus and child is not easy to see. 
Within the terms briet1y explained above, the gynecologist's intervention and 
Haring's interpretation outside the framework of the double effeet principle appears to 
have been the medically reasonable and morally humane course ta follow. This 
position, however, represents the beginning and not the end of the ethical argument 
involving martal conflicts between mother and unborn child. 
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